Discourse Identity, Social Identity, and Confusion in Intercultural Communication

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Discourse identity in intercultural communication

Identity in discourse is a complex issue which goes beyond the question of either the social or personal identities of the participants. Intercultural communication as a field has long recognized that while individual participants may work with the best of intentions, because of culturally structured differences in discursive frames, participants in a discourse may not successfully interpret the intentions of others. News reports of international negotiations, for example, often say that talks have broken down because one side has accused the other of insincerity. Similarly business negotiations across international or cultural boundaries are often halted or delayed because each side believes the other side cannot be trusted. While such accusations are often unfortunately true, in many cases of intercultural communication the mistrust and feelings of insincerity are unintentional. They are the result of misinterpretations of the real intentions of the other side brought about by differences in the ways speakers and writers relate themselves to their discourses.

In this paper I report on an ethnographic study of public discourse in Hong Kong which shows that within any discourse there are specific discourse identities which are expected to be taken up by the participants in the discourse. These discourse identities are not the same as the social identities of the persons who are participants in the discourse. Within any cultural group or discourse system (Scollon and Scollon 1995) there are preferred discourse identities which tend to be matched with particular social identities. Furthermore, within every group, divergences of matched discourse identity from social identity may be taken as
expressions or demonstrations of insincerity, deviance, or dishonesty. That is, clear communication relies on successfully matching the discourse identity and one's expected social identity. To put it more directly: In any discourse you are expected to be the person you present yourself to be.

One paradoxical issue is that when one does successfully adapt to the discourse identity-social identity combinations expected in other languages or by other groups, one feels disconnected. That is, one feels that one is falsifying one's own identity. Similarly, when one unconsciously 'exports' one's preferred discourse identity-social identity matches to other languages or other groups, one may take on unacceptable discourse identities which may be perceived as either unacceptable social identities or as insincerity and dishonesty.

The result of this is that speakers and writers in intercultural communication may be accused of the social faults of insincerity or dishonesty when the social identity they project is perceived to be at variance with their discourse identity: This source of intercultural miscommunication can be alleviated with a clearer understanding of the concept of discourse identity and of cultural differences in the way it is constructed within each discourse.

The structure of discourse identity: production/reception roles

The ways in which a person can enter into a discourse have been shown to be extremely complex (Goffman 1974, 1981). Other analysts have also indicated the polyvocal (Uspensky 1973) or dialogic (Bakhtin 1981 [1934-35 original]) nature of discourse. For my purposes, Goffman's analysis is most directly useful. He indicates, for example three 'production format' roles, animator, author, and principal, which may be analyzed in virtually any act of communication (Goffman 1981).

We normally take it for granted that these three roles are unified in a single person who enters into a discourse. For example, in a conversation with a friend I make up the wordings for the concepts I wish to convey (author), I also speak them with my own voice (animation), and furthermore, except when I quote other people, I take responsibility for what I say (principal). On the other hand, when I write a memorandum and ask a secretary to type it for me, I have separated the role of animation (the mechanical production of the message by typing) from authorship and principalship which I retain.

More extreme cases are not hard to imagine either. A department head might ask me to draft up (author) a letter which is typed (animated) by a secretary, and signed by him (principal) as the person who takes responsibility for the discourse. Presidents of nations often have speech writers (authors) who prepare their addresses which the presidents then animate themselves and for which they also take the responsibility of principal.
Of course in considering various forms of public discourse we should not think that any one of these roles is restricted to a single person. There are a large number of people who are involved in the production of a newspaper (animators), for example, and a president of a nation may have a number of speech writers who jointly author his speeches. Beyond that, in many discourses the responsibility lies with a committee or even a government as when a government employee drafts (authors) and others produce (animate) communications which represent the government (principal).

While Goffman develops these production roles with considerable sophistication, like much other work in interpersonal communication, there is an unbalanced focus on the production of communication with a rather attenuated interest in how communications are received. I argue that a parallel set of receptive roles can be identified which parallel the three production roles. The animator role, for example, focuses on the mechanical or physical production of the signals of communication. The animator is the speaker, the typist, the word processor, the printing press and the people who run it, the microphones and loudspeakers, and all the rest of the mechanical means of communicative production from the lungs and larynx right through to the newspring and soundwaves. That is to say, Goffman's animation focuses on mechanical or physical matters.

I argue that these mechanical matters are paralleled in reception. Thus a person might hear and be able to pass on a message without in any way understanding or interpreting it. This is, indeed, what a linguist or a secretary might be doing in taking down phonetic dictation to be analyzed and interpreted later. It is also what an answering machine and a tape or video recorder do even more accurately and mechanically than the person who operates them. I call this role the receptor role.

Analogously we could say that the author role in Goffman's scheme is a rhetorical one. The author strategizes the communication, chooses the words and the forms it will take. In reception I argue there is an interpreter role which is the interpretation of the rhetorical aspects of the communication. Thus a person might not only hear or read a message (receptor), but also develop a rhetorical interpretation--still staying short of taking any particular action. A secretary might say, for example, 'Ms Smith called and said you might call back (receptor) but I think she meant you ought to call immediately (interpreter). It seems natural to call this role the interpreter role.

Finally, the principal role is that of taking responsibility and I believe it is paralleled in a receptive role as what we might call the judge role, though I am not particular happy with that term. My meaning is to indicate that one might hear a communication (receptor), and interpret its rhetorical intent (interpreter), but it still remains to accept responsibility for undertaking a response.
Adding these three reception roles to Goffman's three production roles we can form the six following production/reception roles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Productive</th>
<th>Receptive</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>animator</td>
<td>mechanical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>author</td>
<td>rhetorical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>principal</td>
<td>responsible</td>
</tr>
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A secretary who receives a telephone call for his or her employer will often simply receive the message, write it down, and pass it on. In this case only a mechanical reception is involved, often without interpretation. In other cases, one might overhear someone asking another to tell him the time. In this case one has received the message in the most basic sense of hearing it, one has also interpreted it accurately, but as it was someone else of which this was asked, the overhearer has no responsibility to respond. That is, he or she has no need to make a judgment about what is the best way to answer the other person in the discourse.

The structure of discourse identity: social/interactive roles

Walking along a street, riding on a bus, or watching people in a cafe, a university lecture, or at a ball game we frequently notice that several people are together and set themselves off from others around them. Goffman observed this characteristic of face-to-face social interaction and called these little groupings 'withs' (1971). A with as Goffman defines it is as follows:

A with is a party of more than one whose members are perceived to be 'together' (p. 19).

The characteristics which he describes are that the with will show ecological proximity, that is they will stand, sit, or otherwise orient themselves toward each other within a relatively small space. They will display what he calls 'civil inattention', that is, they will disregard the sounds and sights of other people immediately within their perceptive field. Among the members of the with there will be special rights to initiate talk and other communications, and there will be special ritual practices for joining and withdrawing. Other researchers (Goodwin 1986, 1995) have added to this list that withs will show their communicative status with eye gaze directed toward or among each other.

Many studies of discourse have focused on this sort of small group or even dyadic social interaction in face-to-face situations. So much is this the case that one finds that the with has often been taken to represent all forms of discourse.
This has led to an unfortunate split between discourse studies which focus upon spoken or oral discourse on the one hand and, on the other, those which focus upon written or mediated discourse even though a series of studies have argued against this dichotomous conceptual division from Tannen's (1982, 1984) early critique to the very recent set of papers edited by Quasthoff (1995).

Recently I have argued that there is an intermediate ground upon which we can establish a further elaboration of social-interactive roles. In a set of studies of television and newspaper discourse (Scollon 1996) I argued that the primary social interactions are, in fact, among journalists with television viewers and readers watching them as spectators. When a presenter reads the evening news, the producer, the people in the studio handling the cameras and microphones, and even the other presenters form the withs within which the news is read.

The social-interactive relationship between the presenter and the viewer must be seen to be of a different order of social interaction (Ang 1996). Thus, in the home, we might find a with consisting of a couple, husband and wife, who are watching the news. Their primary social interaction is with each other as a Goffman-defined with. Their relationship with the television presenter is what I would call a 'watch'. I define a watch as

any person or group of people who are perceived to have attention to some spectacle as the central focus of their (social) activity. The spectacle together with its watchers constitutes the watch (Scollon 1996).

This difference in social-interactive status in the case of a television broadcast or a newspaper has typically been characterized as there being no possibility of feedback among participants, but I believe that characterization is rather limited. In a football game, for example, the spectators as observers watch the spectacle, the game. The primary social interaction among the players is that of a with--they react to each other, adjust their movements to the movements of each other, they have particular, often ritualistic means of joining or withdrawing from the action, and show all the other signs of attention which indicate that they are engaged in the same social interaction.

At the same time, however, there is a kind of social interaction between the players of the game and the spectators watching the game. There are cheers from the crowd and there are gestures from the players toward the crowd. This is also a kind of social interaction, but one which is highly restricted on both ends and with specialized player and spectator rights and obligations.

Players, for example, are expected to direct their attention to performing the game and to make only the most minimal of gestures toward the spectators. In American football players may even be fined for excessive spectator-directed
displays. Spectators on the other hand have the right to highly critical and judgmental commentary and observation. What they may not do is enter into the game.

It is worth noting in this respect that these rights and obligations are maintained even when physically violated. For example, the crowd of spectators may swarm down onto the playing field and in doing so disrupt the primary social interaction, but they may not in doing so enter into the primary social interaction. That is, the spectators may enter the playing field, and perhaps even kick the ball into the goal, but they cannot score a goal.4

The distinction between a with and a watch, then, is that in the former the primary social interaction is based upon more or less reciprocal rights and obligations to maintain the focus of the interaction, but in the latter the rights and obligations are rather asymmetrical -- the participants in the spectacle (players in the ball game or television presenters) have extremely limited rights of interaction with the watchers who have limited rights of involvement but may exercise rather loosely constrained rights to criticism and judgment.

The distinction between withs and watches characterizes the difference between the primary 'players' in face-to-face interaction and those who are only observers or spectators, but there is at least one more form of social interaction which must be considered. To return to the football game analogy, there are the umpires, referees, police, league organizers, team owners, and sporting associations who set the larger frame upon the interaction. Players do not play the game without a set of rules which are set out by the sporting association and enforced upon the field by the referees and linesmen. I call this rather large group of participants in the discourse the 'framers' of the discourse. They do not enter directly into the play, nor are they often actual observers (though they may be observers as well), but they do set the frames within which play takes place.

I have mentioned such framers of the discourse in the case of a football match as the referees or owners. In other forms of discourse such as the production of the daily newspaper the role of framer is played by a range of people including the owners, or the organizations which sponsor the paper, the upper-level editorial staff, and even in some cases the advertisers when they set restrictions upon what forms of discourse may or may not be performed within the boundaries of their financial support.

Using these three perspectives on social interaction, then, I would like to distinguish at least three social-interactive roles as follows:

framers: have overriding rights to define communicative events
players: form 'withs' with focal attention upon maintaining the discourse

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observers: neither define the events nor participate as withs, but have heightened observational rights

Discourse identity

I am now in the position to define discourse identity as follows:

Discourse identity is the persona along with the degree or range of power a particular person can claim in a specific discourse. It consists of the range of production/reception format roles intersecting with the social-interactive roles over which one has the power, right, or obligation to enact in any particular discourse.

This definition, of course, reflects the normative notion of the identity one is expected to claim which raises further difficulties of answering by whom these expectations are held. It also raises the problem of contested identities and falsified identities. My purpose in using such a normative definition is to be able to show that, in fact, there are often rather serious departures from these norms, but because these norms are held, the interpretations which arise from departures are themselves the grounds for misinterpretation of intentions or even hostilities. It is to these departures from expected discourse identity to which I turn in the following section.

Negotiated identities

The concept of intercultural communication relies heavily upon the idea of culture itself—that broad groups of human organization can be analyzed which are distinct enough in their internal characteristics that members of these groups differ significantly from members of other cultural groups. While this has been a very useful idea in some areas of anthropology and sociology, the concept of culture is often problematical in studies of discourse and communication. If one wants to speak of cultural differences between 'Chinese' and 'Westerners' one is rather easily led into simple stereotypical descriptions which, in fact, fit none of the members of either group in any realistic way.

Carbaugh (1994) gives a striking example from the point of view of stereotypical characterizations of 'Western' behavior. At Oxford in England he, an American, had a conversation with a British scholar in which each failed to understand the basis of the other's position. The British scholar asked him something like, 'What brings you to Oxford?' Carbaugh answered that he was there to study some particular research issue, but that answer completely failed to satisfy the British questioner who in several attempts repeated his question.
The problem as Carbaugh describes it is that from an American point of view, one operates as an individual scholar whose own research interests and problems are the dominant ones and therefore the question of why he had gone to Oxford was taken by him to be a question about his personal interests and motives. What he learned was that for the British scholar at Oxford, the most important single issue is to which part of the Oxford social and institutional structure one is attached. This is the fundamental basis for all other social interaction. The question, 'What brings you here?' means something like 'What is your social position? Are you a student, a lecturer, a professor, a visitor? If you are attached to Oxford, to which college are you attached?' Only within that institutional position can his research interests then be pursued.

To phrase Carbaugh's example in terms of discourse identity and social identity, Carbaugh, as an American, took it that his primary social identity was as an independent research scholar. Furthermore, as an American it was his independent and individualistic position which gave him the right to author, animate, and to be the principal of what he said about his own research interests. And beyond that, he felt that he could exercise the right to speak freely both as a player in this discourse and as the framer of the overall discourse itself. In other words, Carbaugh's assumption was that within academic discourse, the individual scholar is both framer and player and that these two social-interactive roles grant to him the right to freely take on all production/reception roles.

The British scholar's assumption, as Carbaugh describes it, is that the institutions of academic discourse--particularly those of Oxford University--are granted the primary framing role. Those institutions frame academic discourse so that only those to whom the institutions have granted the right to become players can engage in mutual academic exchanges. Within that frame, of course, the exchanges are much like those of the American scholar--the individual may take on all three production/reception roles and thus, within the proper frame American and British scholars look quite similar to each other.

Where Carbaugh and his British counterpart had gone wrong was that the British scholar was asking quite indirectly, 'What institution here frames your position in the discourse as a player?' His answer, again quite indirectly, was to ignore that aspect of the question and therefore to answer, 'No institution has the right to frame my position in this discourse.' That is an answer that was unintelligible to his British counterpart. From Carbaugh's point of view the British scholar's insistence upon repeating his question about why he was in Oxford was equally unintelligible.

This is a simple case of two scholars who are in many respects quite similar and from quite similar 'Western' cultural groups but who belong to rather different discourse systems and therefore cannot successfully interpret each other. Their
inability to interpret each other is tied directly to the fact that each was taking up a discourse identity which was different from that expected by the other.

But is this a 'cultural' issue? That is to say, have I only refined the definition of 'Western culture' a bit by making a distinction between 'American culture' and 'British culture'? Together with my colleague Suzanne Scollon we have argued (Scollon and Scollon 1995) that it might be more useful to speak of systems of discourse than of cultures and therefore to speak of interdiscourse system communication instead of intercultural communication.

I used this example of the British and the American scholar in a lecture last year and although I described Carbaugh as an American male, I made no reference to the gender of the British scholar. A woman, herself British and from Oxford, commented to me later that she was certain, although I had not said so, that the British scholar was a male. She was, of course, correct in this supposition. Although I can only speculate in this case, what I would suggest is that what Carbaugh describes more broadly as a difference between American and British assumptions might better be narrowed to the intersection among British and American academic discourse systems and a trans-cultural gender discourse system. That is to say, this conversation might have been very different had the participants been an American woman scholar and a Oxford woman scholar.

In developing the idea of discourse systems we have argued that in any particular situation there are multiple discourse systems operating and that a major aspect in any communication is an ongoing negotiation of a person's discourse identity within several discourse systems. Thus as a man or a woman, a person participates within a gender discourse system. At the same time as a member of a particular generation or class—I belong, for example, to an American class/generation formed within the Great Depression and the Second World War among immigrant factory workers—one shares many characteristics with other members of that same generation. One's place of employment often forms another type of occupational or professional discourse system with its own internal forms of discourse, assumptions about proper relationships among its members and between its members and outsiders, and ways of socializing new members.

Any person simultaneously must negotiate a position among all of the discourse systems to which one belongs as a crucial aspect of one's ability to communicate. To use the terminology I am developing here, one's discourse identity in any particular discourse is an identity negotiated among all of the potential discourse identities defined by the discourse systems of which one is a member.

Discourse identity in news discourse
Intellectual copyright is an issue between nations over which we have recently seen intensive and sometimes acrimonious negotiations. Furthermore, within academic domains there have been a growing number of cases in which the issue of plagiarism has been seen to be compounded by ‘cultural’ differences in assumptions about when and where it is appropriate to cite references to the texts of others. I would like to argue that in addition to the fundamental issues of ownership and theft involved there may also be problems of differences in discourse identity at issue in these cases.

In a series of studies of news discourse in Hong Kong we have found that across newspapers there are major differences in patterns of bylining, the major means by which newspapers identify the writers of news stories and in patterns of quotation (Li et al. 1993; Scollon and Scollon, in press; Yung 1995). For example, in comparing a story about a tragic accident on New Year’s Day 1993 we found that the English newspaper, the *South China Morning Post*, gave the story under the name of a bylined author, Tommy Lewis. The story about the same event in the Chinese newspaper, *Ming Pao*, appeared with no indication of authorship.

When one compares these two stories with many others which appear in these two newspapers one finds that regularly the *South China Morning Post* and *Ming Pao* display this difference in pattern which is further supported by another practice—that of quotation. One finds that it is much more common to find the words of newsmakers cited as direct quotations in the the *South China Morning Post* than *Ming Pao*. As we argued in our report on this contrastive study (Li et al 1993), what one hears in *Ming Pao* stories is the the editorial voice, but in *South China Morning Post* it is the reporter’s and the newsmaker’s voices one hears.

To contrast these two newspapers in terms of discourse identity and social roles, one could say that same social role—the newspaper reporter—is expected to display different discourse identities. The *South China Morning Post* the framers of the discourse—the owners and editors—delegate principalship and authorship to reporters in almost all instances other than on the editorial page. In turn, reporters may delegate some degrees of both authorship and principalship to newsmakers through quotation.

That is to say, the framers of the discourse set the major editorial policies but then retire from sight giving the appearance at least that reporters are taking direct responsibility for what they write.

We know, of course, that the various sub-editors who prepare the headlines and leads and who also control other matters of layout take on a very significant authorship role (Bell 1991), but they present themselves as having no authorial voice; they remain anonymous. The reporters are the ones who are expected to display the discourse identity of the named author and principal of the stories.
In the case of the stories in *Ming Pao* we find that reporters take on the role of authors but principalship remains firmly in the hands of the editorial staff, the framers of the discourse. Furthermore, as there are very few quotations, it seems that since the reporters themselves have not been delegated the discourse identity of a named author/principal, they themselves do not have the power to further delegate these roles to the newsmakers about which they write. In other words, the major difference between these two newspapers in the question of discourse identity is that the reporters in the *South China Morning Post* are framed as players with rights to both authorship and principalship and further with the right to delegate those production format roles to newsmakers; in *Ming Pao* the reporters are framed as very restricted players with only authorship rights--they are not delegated the right to take on responsibility through being named in a byline.

It is clear that the social roles of newspaper reporters are substantially the same in both cases. At news conferences, for example, all reporters from whatever sources must display press cards to be allowed into the conference, they frequently associate with each other at other events, and socially associate with each other as well. In other words, the differences we see on the pages of the newspaper (the discourse identity) are not paralleled by differences in the social role of newspaper reporter, they are differences within that particular discourse. We can outline these discourse identities as follows:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST</th>
<th>MING PAO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Framers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>editors</em></td>
<td>principal</td>
<td>principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Players</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>reporters</em></td>
<td>principal, author</td>
<td>author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>newsmakers</em></td>
<td>principal, author</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>publication staff</em></td>
<td>animation</td>
<td>animation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

There is a systematic difference in the discourse identities taken on by news reporters in these two Hong Kong newspapers. These two newspapers differ in language and so one might be tempted to leap to conclusions about linguistic or cultural differences. If all one were to look at were other English language newspapers, one would see that the *South China Morning Post* uses bylining and quotation much like almost all other English newspapers in Asia, North American, Europe, and Australia. Further, one finds almost no newspapers which display the discourse identity for reporters of the *Ming Pao*.
Nevertheless, one must be careful. The very widely published British English language periodical *The Economist* does not give bylines to its reporters and thus we see that while there may be a difference in practices across genres--newspapers and magazines--we cannot claim any clear linguistic or cultural difference in practices. Also, and more to the point, other Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong as well as major Chinese newspapers in China practice very careful and rigorous bylining practices. For example, one finds very few news items in *Renmin Ribao* or *Guangzhou Ribao* without very specific identification of the reporters by name and news organization.

Within this example of newspaper discourse I have described two different patterns of discourse identity, one in which the social role of the reporter is expected to take on both authorship in writing the article and principalship through the display of his or her name in the byline and another in which this same social role is expected to take on only authorship. I have shown that there is no simple means of ascribing these two different discourse patterns to cultural or linguistic differences since not all of the newspapers in Chinese nor all of the newspapers in Hong Kong expect their reporters to take on the same discourse identity.

**Consequences of mis-matching social and discourse identities**

The question I want to raise, finally, is what happens when one expects one pattern and finds the other? In interviews where I ask the question: 'Why does the English language newspaper *South China Morning Post* have bylines and the Chinese language newspaper *Ming Pao* not have them?' I am told that this is because in Western culture there is an emphasis on the individual and putting the byline on a writer's story gives him or her credit for his or her original creative contribution. On the other hand, I am told that Chinese are collectivistic and prefer not to let the individual stand out or to take on distinctive individualistic identity. Thus, I am told, these two patterns of bylining reflect primary cultural differences between Chinese culture and Western culture by marking the difference between collective social organization and individualistic social organization.

When I then introduce the second question, 'Why, then, in the Chinese newspapers from the People's Republic of China are the reporters fully credited with bylines?' a frequent response is that this must be wrong, am I really sure? In other words, it does not fit the explanation of East-West cultural difference and so the respondents doubt the data rather than their explanation. Another answer I frequently get, however, is that this is because in China there is no freedom of expression and anything written in the newspaper must be carefully attached to a particular writer so that if something goes wrong the responsibility can be directed at that person. In other words, I am told that one and the same discourse identity in
'the West' reflects a free society which values individuality and creative expression but in China the same discourse identity represents just the opposite, a collective society in which individual expression must be watched carefully.

Many years ago at the height of the Cold War in the 1950's I read an article in the Saturday Review of Literature. School children in the United States were shown photographs of trees along a country road which they were told was in Kansas and then were asked the question, 'Why have trees been planted along the roadside?' The answer they gave was that this was to protect the soil on the fields from erosion or to beautify the landscape. Another group of children were shown the same photograph but told that the picture was taken in Russia and were then asked the same question. The answer they gave was that the Russians had planted those trees to hide what was going on behind them--probably some military installation or some other military secret.

**Conclusion**

We draw inferences based upon our assumptions about the nature of the world. This is no less true in intercultural discourse. When we have an expectation for the match-up between a social role and a discourse identity, we then use that expectation to interpret any deviations from that match-up. If we expect reporters to have bylines, we then need to find an interpretation for cases in which they do not. On the other hand, if we expect the voice of the reporter to be hidden behind the voice of the editor, we need to find an interpretation for the cases in which the reporter is clearly identified.

This research shows that often those interpretations about mis-matches will call upon stereotypical and often negative perceptions of the people involved in the mismatched discourse identities. The role of culture in this process is more likely to be as a source of unexamined ideological and stereotypical assumptions made about expected matches of social identities and discourse identities than in the structure of those identities themselves. The concept of discourse identity, by increasing our awareness of the complexity of the roles we take on in discourse including production/reception format roles as well as social-interactive roles, will increase our awareness of the dangers of drawing overly hasty inferences about people who are different from each other.
Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at The 5th International Conference on Cross-Cultural Communication: East and West, August 15-19, 1995, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China.

2. I will keep to Goffman's practice of not indicating the nominal usage of this word with single quotation marks hereafter, even though I recognize that from time to time this usage requires giving a sentence a second reading. I will adopt the same practice below in regard to the term 'watch'. This latter term has a long established nominal form.

3. Non-hearing withs are an exception to this principle since a direct line of sight is the crucial necessity to direct sign-language communication.

4. The recent case where an English football player was convicted in court for kicking a spectator shows how seriously the division between player and observer is maintained. While the spectator was said to have overstepped his critical and judgmental rights by making racial comments, the football player exceeded his rights to territory by jumping into the stands and kicking the spectator. Had the spectator restricted his negative comments to the quality of the football player's game it is quite unlikely that the event of crossing the boundary of the two types of social interaction would have occurred.

5. I apologize for not being able to locate a reference to this article. It appeared sometime in the period of 1956 - 1958, the period during which I regularly read that magazine.
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