The Construction of Taiwanese as Chinese:  
A Public Relations Approach to Explore Chinese Leader’s Discourse

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Abstract

This research explored public relations strategies for building the relationship between China and Taiwan through analyzing public discourses of Chinese Presidents—Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao—to Taiwan. A comparative discourse analysis was used to examine five important dimensions in China’s political discourses concerning the one-China policy: theme, relationship managing, target public, national identity, and national development. Additionally, an exploratory discourse analysis was conducted to further investigate the characteristics of Hu Jintao’s public discourses on the Taiwan issue. These analyses in the present research may provide contributions in developing negotiation agenda and political campaign strategies, particular for policymakers and public communication practitioners, who strive to build a better relationship between China and Taiwan.

The reunification of China with Taiwan was an important national or international policy of China’s government. In 1945 China and Taiwan were separately administrated by two different governments, one dominated by Mao Zedong’s regime and the other controlled by Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. From 1945 to 2005, the two sides both experienced revolutions in the political and economic systems. On the one hand, the Chinese government opened the door for its economic development based upon Deng Xiaoping’s policy in the past 15 years. However, Chinese government still employed Mao’s democratic centralism in its political administration, although the political system of China was influenced by the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On the other hand, Taiwanese government was dramatically influenced in both politics and economics by Western Capitalism. Many economics policies were mostly built based upon Western economic systems. In addition, Western political philosophies were the foundations of the democratic society in Taiwan after Chiang’s regime. The democratization of Taiwan fostered the totally different ideology of Taiwanese from that of Chinese. Because of ideology, the Taiwanese perception of Chinese becomes much the same as that of other communist countries and more different from that of other democratic countries.

For moving toward a unification, the one-China policy, which was made for incorporating Taiwan into one nation, was one of the most important ambitions for Chinese government. In this vein, the Chinese government was reluctant to see that Taiwan sought to be independent from one-China, and they dedicated themselves to the recovery of control over Taiwan by China. In this process they used various ways, such as economic interdependency with Taiwan and international isolation of Taiwan. Hence, the Chinese government employed many kinds of political discourses to make a closer relationship with people in Taiwan in order to persuade them to accept the reunification.
This research examines the Chinese political discourses for the one-China policy. It is divided into two sections. The first section compares official statements of the former and current China leaders to those of the Taiwan leaders, including Jiang Zemin’s eight-point proposal on Taiwan issue and Hu Jintao’s four-point guideline in the China-Taiwan relation. The second section looks at the characteristics of Hu’s public discourse on the Taiwan issue. This research was based on an exploratory discourse analysis of news stories, looking at the implications for development communication between two sides for nation-building.

**Related Studies and Issues**

Public communication campaigns were strategic efforts that particularly influenced on targeted publics in a predefined timeframe (Rogers & Storey, 1987). Most of the public communication campaigns sponsored by governments mainly delivered public information, such as public health and public safety. Public communication campaigns, like other strategic communication efforts, had specific goals outlined by campaign planners. These goals can be viewed as campaign intents, which strove to cut down the knowledge gap between campaign planners and audiences, and the fewer knowledge gaps would build harmony in relationships between persuaders and the targeted public (Hornik, 1988).

In addition to lessening the knowledge gaps, the communication campaigns played the role of educating the target public. Through the processes of educating the public, the communication campaigns created the condition for the target public to realize their problems and solve these problems (Hornik, 1988). In this vein, the public communication campaigns, which delivered some specific information, definitely caused rapid developments because they built a better condition for the public to improve their lives. These developments contributed by public communication campaigns could be termed as political and economic developments of nations (Taylor, 2000).

In many studies of development communication, the wide use of a communication campaign would be designed to solve social and development problems. As examined by Schramm (1964), communication campaigns could modernize some parts of society. In addition, Taylor (2000) maintained that the government could utilize public communication campaigns as valuable resources for nation-building. Thus, public communication campaigns associated with national development could also be one aspect of nation-building. However, much of the core of public communication campaigns was top-down communication from government and international organization to the public (Schramm and Lerner, 1976), although there were a lot of government-sponsored communication campaigns that were designed in favor of more participatory and bottom-up approach (Marsden, 1990). From the public relations perspective, as Grunig and Hunt (1984) stated, public communication campaigns and development communication should be placed in the asymmetrical communication model. The relationship between the intent of campaign planners and the right of the target public could be questioned because of the unbalanced relationships between the two sides.

Alternatively, as stated by Salmon (1989), public communication campaigns needed to reassess the traditional view that the public was to be moved, but not persuaded, to action. Hence, how to make the public more participatory, with emphasis on the two-way communication model, in the development communication process was a big issue for campaign planners and public relations practitioners. Taylor (2000) initiated the study that public relations could be used to establish, maintain, or change dynamic relationships between
like-minded people and organizations for positively influencing social and political development.

The researcher believed that the Chinese government would employ a public relations approach for improving dynamic relationships between the Chinese government and the Taiwanese for nation-building. This research examined the link between the strategy of China’s political discourse and development communication for national-building in term of public relations campaigns.

**Nation-Building**

Nation-building was the process through which nations were created and national identities were constructed. Deutsch (1963) viewed nations as a social cohesion held together by the ability of organizations to communicate effectively. He also stated that a nation was formed based upon “different plans, various materials, different sequence of steps, changes of international politics, and the process of nation-building would be directed by the choice, will and power of its builders. Additionally, the nation-building process would be influenced by which “diverse societies, regions, and groups within a country were linked into a national-state system” (Morrison, 1989, p.18).

As defined by Huntington (1969), the term nation-building was associated with building political institutes in a newly formed nation, and these political institutions helped a newly formed nation to meet the political and social demands of its citizens. These political institutions could include governmental organizations (e.g., official institutes), and nongovernmental organizations (e.g., NGOs, political parties and nonparties, and professional institutes).

In China’s case, the Taiwan Affair Office of the State Council was an official institution set up to interact with Taiwan’s government. Similarly, Taiwan also had an official institution named Mainland Affairs Council to communicate with Chinese government. However, the two political institutions were dominated by two separate governments with different ideologies. Their dialogs were closed by the two governments after the Taiwan president—Lee Teng-Hui visited to the United States. Hence, currently there is no official institute for managing the relationship between China and Taiwan.

In addition to political institutions, supported by governments, that can help nation-building, Meyer (1997) stated that relationship building that can contribute to nation-building was through the establishment of cooperative nongovernmental organization in transitional nations. Thus, nongovernmental organization was another channel that could prompt nation-building. There were still some nongovernmental organizations, respectively named the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait serving for people living in China and the Strait Exchange Foundation serving for people residing in Taiwan. The two nongovernmental organizations were endowed by the Chinese and Taiwanese governments to meet and make the consensus in one-China policy in 1992. Although the two organizations had lots of interactions in 1990s, their interactions were also blocked after Chen Suei-bian, who supported an independent Taiwan, won the presidential election in 2000. However, since Taiwan was a democratically multiparty country, many political parties without governmental approval successfully visited to China to have interactions with Chinese government for improving the relationship between the two sides.

Currently, the only one of the political institutions for managing the relationships between China and Taiwan to nation-building was the political party, but these interactions
between Taiwan’s parties and Chinese government cannot bring about many contributions in improving the official relationships between the two sides. Thus, public discourse of the Chinese leader to Taiwanese was the only and the most important tool in managing relationship for nation-building between the Chinese government and Taiwanese. The tactics for successfully managing the relationship between the two sides were an important issue in the process of nation-building.

**Relationship Managing**

In the theoretical perspective, the characteristic of relationship communication focused on the way in which people together managed various aspects of their relationships through communication. Some scholars (e.g., Berger & Bradac, 1982) stated that managing relationships was to manage uncertainty and anxiety. On the other hand, some scholars (e.g., Gudykunst, 1988) focused relationship communication on managing faces that could be defined as the self-identities. Both concepts could be used in relationships managing between China and Taiwan, since national identity and political ideology were regionally different between the two sides. The reunification of China with Taiwan could increase the Taiwanese uncertainty and anxiety, which would take Taiwanese into a politically different organization. Additionally, the tension between China and Taiwan may be increased when relationships between the two sides would not be managed well. Moreover, it can be considered that the process of managing relationships between the two sides was comparatively complex, so that a one-way and asymmetrical communication model can not be applied in the strategy of China’s political discourse, especially when the two sides independently overemphasized their own self. Moreover, the study of Berger and Bradac (1982) was concerned with objective self-consciousness. This concept clearly stated that person centered on the self rather than the other objects in the environment.

China and Taiwan both were countries with an emphasis on nationalism. They both paid much attention to their own self-identities when their nationalistic identities were challenged. In the perspective of China, Taiwan was one part of China’s territory. Taiwan independence would not be allowed by the Chinese government. Moreover, China strove to localize Taiwan as a special administrative region and attempted to devalue Taiwan’s authority in developing their relationship for one-China building. Alternatively, in the perspective of Taiwan, Taiwan had an independent authority and was never administrated by communist China. In this vein, Taiwan viewed itself as the same political status as China, not just one part of China, but an individual part from China. Thus, their diverse perspectives posed a dilemma in relationship managing. In their relation, a two-way and symmetrical communication model may be the only way for persuading Chinese and Taiwanese into an interactively communicative relationship.

**Public Relations Application**

As stated by Ledingham and Bruning (2000), successful relationship managing depended on understanding what must be done to initiate, develop, and maintain the relationship. According to Ferguson (1984), the first step towards relationship building required learning about relevant publics and their social environment. Ledingham (2000) also stated that public relations can function as a vehicle for accommodating different perspectives and reducing conflict. Public relations techniques and processes acted to resolve differences within the social system, which was comprised of organizations and publics, and connected
the relationships between organizations and publics. In this vein, public relations would be a
good role of managing organization-public relationships for nation-building. A public
relations approach was a key concept in managing relationship to nation-building. As stated
by Ferguson (1984), relationship-building was the focus of public communications efforts and
provided a basis for measuring the effectiveness of public relations campaigns. The goals of
public relations can be achieved by developing and maintaining a successful relationship with
the public (Kovacs, 2001). Thus, public relations approaches may be used in develop China’s
political discourse.

Based upon the previous literatures, the researcher adopts five dimensions for
evaluating the effectiveness of Chinese leaders’ political discourses for nation-building. The
five dimensions can be used to analyze comparatively the former and current Chinese leader’s
political discourse to Taiwan in the terms of theme, relationship managing, target public,
national identity and national development.

Research Questions
This research applied public relations perspectives to analyze how the relationship
between China and Taiwan was developed in China’s political discourse. The research also
examined whether China’s political discourse focused on cooperative relationships and
provided a communication-oriented, participatory approach for improving the China-Taiwan
relationship. Based upon this point, the research directed three research questions in
examining China’s political discourses in the following:
RQ1. How did China’s political discourse change from Jiang Zemin’s eight-point proposal to
Hu Jintao’s four-point policy for managing the relationships between China and Taiwan?
RQ2. How were Taiwanese viewed as the target public in Hu Jintao’s political discourse for
nation-building?
RQ3. What were the characteristics of Hu Jintao’s public speeches in improving the
relationship between China and Taiwan?

Method
For these research questions, Chinese’s political discourses to Taiwan were analyzed
in this research. The discourses were examined in two dimensions. In the first dimension, a
comparative discourse analysis was conducted to examine two Chinese leaders’ political
discourses to Taiwan. These political discourses included the announcements addressed by
Chinese former and current leaders—Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The first announcement
stated by Jiang Zemin in 1995 was to respond that the Taiwanese government’s Xi He policy
for seeking support from the Western countries to resist China’s authority. The second
announcement addressed by Hu Jintao was to reply that Chen Suei-Bian offered a four-point
policy in conducting a new direction for China-Taiwan relations in 2003.

In the second dimension, an exploratory discourse analysis was used to investigate
the characteristics of Hu Jintao’s public discourses on the Taiwan issues. These public
discourses included his speeches reported on international news coverage. The news stories
were collected from five mainstream newspapers in the United States, including the New York
Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe
since these news stories are accessible in the ProQuest newspaper website. A total of 27 news
stories were analyzed during the period from March 28, 2003—the day the Hu was elected as
a Chinese leader—to March 28, 2006 when Hu has been a Chinese leader for three years.
Findings

Comparative Discourse Analysis

A comparative discourse analysis was used in this research for analyzing political discourses of two Chinese leaders to Taiwan. The discourses were retrieved from Jiang Zemin’s eight-point proposal on the Taiwan issue and Hu Jintao’s four-point guideline in the China-Taiwan relations. The research also looked at the strategies of both political discourses in persuading Taiwanese to accept the one-China policy. The category including five dimensions was used in this discursive analysis: theme, relationship managing, target public, national development, and national identity.

Theme. Adherence to the one-China policy was the common theme of both political discourses. That was the reason why both discourses would be made. However, there were some differences between their political discourses in the respective themes. In the historical perspective, Jiang Zemin publicized his discourse in 1995, just before Hong Kong became a special administrative region of China in 1997. Hong Kong was still colonized by the United Kingdoms when Jian declared this discourse. Hence, the first concern of China was how to administrate Hong Kong in the postcolonial period, so that the Taiwan issue was not what China was concerned with at that time.

In Jiang’s eight-point proposal, the theme was to build a channel of interaction between China and Taiwan without breaking the one-China policy. In addition, Jiang’s discourse stated that China would not fight Chinese and cause any danger to Taiwan if there was no Taiwan independence. Jiang used the word “fight” to warn the Chinese in Taiwan of the result of breaking the one-China policy. The theme of his discourse was more like a military announcement.

Alternatively, the theme of Hu’s four-point guideline for the China-Taiwan relations was obviously more hospitable than that of Jiang’s. Although Hu’s discourse only was included in four-point guidelines, the four-point guideline outlined more details about Taiwan’s future with China. Obviously, the intention of Hu’s discourse was to express that China was completely ready to negotiate with the Taiwan for nation-building since the Taiwan issue was the first one that currently concerned China. Hu’s four-point guideline was more effective in persuading Taiwanese to accept the one-China policy than Jiang’s.

In addition, Hu used comparatively friendly wording in describing the expectations of two sides in the reunification for many times. He preferred to use equality-status to look at the China-Taiwan relations and he avoided using more challenging words dealing with Taiwan independence, although he still insisted on the one-China policy. Thus, although both themes focused on the one-China policy, Hu’s discourse to Taiwan seemed more public-relations oriented than Jiang’s discourse in the term of theme.

Relationship Managing. In Jiang’s discourse, relationship managing emphasized building a more interactively communicative environment between China’s and Taiwan’s governments. Jiang focused on welcoming political leaders’ visits from Taiwan and the interchange of various political perspectives of Taiwan’s leaders. Although he agreed that China can negotiate with Taiwan on an equal footing to reach an agreement in the China-Taiwan relation, he still preferred to place the status of Taiwan as a special administration
region of China. Several times, he mentioned everything would stay the same after Taiwan’s reunification with China, including the current existence of Taiwan’s nongovernmental relation with foreign countries. However, he indirectly denied the existence of Taiwan’s official foreign relations with other countries.

As previously discussed, Taiwan, like China, was a country with an emphasis on nationalism. Jiang’s discourse circuitously devalued Taiwan’s elected authority. Hence, although Jiang strove to create interactions between China and Taiwan, his relationship-managing skill lacked the ability to maintain the equal relationship between the two sides, which had the offer of increasing the uncertainty and anxiety of Taiwanese when Taiwanese had to face the reunification with China.

Alternatively, Hu’s discourse, like Jiang’s discourse, was to prompt the dialogues between China and Taiwan. Moreover, his discourse not only welcomed the interactions between politicians of two sides, but also greeted all of Taiwanese people who adhered to the one-China policy and visited to China for developing business and farm affairs. Hence, Hu’s discourse strove to build the relationship between Chinese people of both sides for improving the dynamic relationship between the two governments.

In addition, Hu’s discourse did not clearly define the future status of Taiwan after Taiwan’s reunification with China. His discourse indicated that he considered Taiwan’s future as an open status without violating the one-China policy. In this vein, Hu attempted to make the official relationship between two governments an ambiguous one in order to avoid the possibility that the Taiwanese would think that China’s government would devalue Taiwan authority after Taiwan was reunified with China. Thus, it was obvious that Hu’s discourse encouraged the interactions by building various kinds of cooperative relationships between the Chinese and Taiwanese.

**Target Public.** The target public was the most important as well as the most different part in the both discourse. In Jiang’s discourse, Jiang viewed Taiwan’s government as be representative of all people living in Taiwan. He believed that Taiwan’s government was equal to those people in Taiwan and seemed to suppose that Taiwan independence was on an incline. Thus, in Jiang’s perspective, there was no difference among all people in Taiwan, and Taiwan’s government can be represented by those people in Taiwan. Therefore, the target public that Jiang strove to persuade was Taiwan’s government that was representative to all people in Taiwan.

In addition, Jiang’s discourse showed that the Taiwan issue should be handled by the Chinese themselves, not other forces, since the Taiwan issue was viewed as China’s internal affair. He attempted to prevent the international community’s intervention in China’s national affairs. In this vein, Jiang seemed to warn some Western countries that supported Taiwan independence, especially the United States because the United States sold lots of weapons to Taiwan based upon Taiwan Relations Act made by the United States and Taiwan’s governments. Thus, Jiang attempted to persuade the United States and Taiwan that Taiwan independence was absolutely not allowed by the Chinese government.

In comparison to Jiang’s discourse, the target public in Hu’s discourse seemed to be comparatively diversified. In Hu’s discourse, he strove to differentiate the Taiwanese into three groups—anti-secessionist, secessionist and neutralist. Obviously, Hu mainly focused the target public on these anti-secessionists in Taiwan. Additionally, he further stated that once the one-China policy was followed, he would absolutely make positive responses to Taiwan. Moreover, he would never give up persuading these neutral people in the one-China policy to
accept Taiwan’s reunification with China. He believed that most neutralists were reluctant to see a war between the two sides. Hence, he also drew the advantages of peaceful reunification. Finally, he did not mention these secessionists in his discourse. It was evident that he already denied communicating with these secessionists in the one-China issue.

Additionally, Hu did not cover the intervention of the Western countries in his discourse, although the United States and other Western countries still sold weapons to Taiwan. It could be considered that Hu strove to view the Taiwan question as one of China’s domestic affairs, not making the Taiwan question internationalized. His discourse attempted to produce internal conflicts within Taiwan on the issue of Taiwan independence by persuading different kinds of people in various ways. Thus, it was obvious that he attempted to associate with those anti-secessionists in Taiwan to prompt the one-China perspective through his political discourse to Taiwan.

**National Development.** Jiang’s and Hu’s discourse on the Taiwan issue both drew upon national development after Taiwan was reunified. In Jiang’s discourse, he emphasized the national development of Taiwan, but not the whole of China. He stated that there would be not any changes within Taiwan after the reunification. However, he did not mention other political reformation and economic developments after the reunification. Although he stated that if Taiwan independence was initiated there would be a war, he still promised that Taiwan would keep its armed forces and administrators, its party, government, and military by itself after the reunification. China would not station troops and send administrative personnel to Taiwan, but a number of posts in China would be made available to Taiwan.

Thus, in Jiang’s discourse, peace would be expected in China’s national development. However, Jiang’s discourse seemed to describe peace as a donation that China was forcing Taiwan to receive. Jiang listed what Taiwan could get after the reunification in his peaceful perspective, but what Taiwan would get after the reunification was what Taiwan currently owned, excepting that some Taiwanese can hold offices in China. It was still a question of whether being an officer in China was a good idea for some Taiwanese, because the political ideologies between the two sides had been different since 1949. The strategy of national development in Jiang’s discourse was unattractive to Taiwanese since he overemphasized peace but ignored how the nation would develop after the unification.

In Hu’s discourse, he described Taiwan’s reunification with China as the expectation of all Chinese between the two sides, which would directly bring about national development. Hu mentioned that the importance of social stability and economic growth for China and Taiwan and that social stability and economic growth could be efficiently achieved by the reunification. He also mentioned that the reunification would prompt interchanges between the two sides, which would produce maximal interests for one-China. Hu promised what Jiang promised in his discourse. However, Hu did not reveal further detailed information about how Taiwan would develop in the future.

To some extent, Hu did not clearly explain national development in the future, but he did strive to highlight the relationship between China and Taiwan as flesh-and-blood brothers in one family. He believed that China and Taiwan should resolve their own problems peacefully and the peaceful reunification would share the dignity and glory of the great motherland. It was obvious that Hu preferred to draw a peaceful picture in a sensitive way, rather than providing a comprehensible direction for nation development. Hence, the national development in Hu’s discourse, like Jiang’s, overemphasized the importance of peace and overlooked how to direct the national development after the reunification. Therefore, Chinese
leaders should consider that political reformation was the dynamics of national development. Addressing political reformation in the political discourse was a good strategy to persuade Taiwanese to accept the renunciation.

**National Identity.** In Jiang’s discourse, he highlighted that the Chinese would not fight fellow Chinese. Jiang seemed to ask the people living in Taiwan to recognize their national identity. To some extent, he circuitously revealed that being Taiwanese could be dangerous. In addition, he applied cultural convergence to persuade that most Taiwanese came from China. It seemed a good way to remind the people living in Taiwan that the Chinese and the Taiwanese were both fostered by the same culture. However, sharing the same culture was not equal to having the same national identity. To some extent, the Chinese and the Taiwanese both understood that the big difference between the two sides was their political ideology. Thus, a Chinese leader should understand that China’s political system through the perception of Taiwan was an important issue for future nation-building.

The idea of flesh-and blood brothers in one family was used to describe the China-Taiwan relation in Hu’s discourse three times. Hu strove to persuade the Taiwanese to identify China as their country by relative relation to reinforce national identity. Additionally, he stated that China belonged to the 1.3 billion Chinese people, including the 23 million Chinese living in Taiwan. Any issues involving China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be decided collectively by the entire 1.3 billion Chinese people. In this vein, he attempted to tie the Chinese with the Taiwanese closely and viewed China and Taiwan as a unity, not as two individual parts. He repeatedly reminded the Taiwanese to understand Chinese disappointments about Taiwan independence. In this vein, he used more sensitive techniques to persuade the Taiwanese, but he did not make a lot of links between the Chinese and the Taiwanese in the different dimensions. Thus, his strategy in persuading the Taiwanese to recognize their Chinese identity was convincing, but not comprehensive.

**Exploratory Discourse Analysis**

The communication strategy of the two Chinese leaders to Taiwanese was different. Jiang held a top-down communication model to express the one-China policy to Taiwanese, while Hu tried to employ equality-status to convey the one-China policy in an interactive communication oriented way. Their interpretations of the one-China policy were similar, but their communicative strategies differently influenced the dynamic relationships between China and Taiwan in their own way and shaped a different Chinese image to Taiwanese. This research used an exploratory discourse analysis to look at the characteristics of Hu’s public speeches on the Taiwan issue that were reported on five U.S. mainstream newspapers and examine how Hu Jintao adhered to the one-China policy to persuade Taiwanese to accept the reunification with China.

**Chinese vs. Taiwanese.** In Hu’s public speeches, he never used “Taiwanese” to call the people living in Taiwan, but used “Taiwan compatriots” to name them. In Hu’s perspective, Taiwan was one part of China’s territory. Obviously, he not only believed that all of people living in Taiwan were Chinese, but also eliminated any specific term in describing these people living in Taiwan. More frequently, he used “all Chinese on the both sides of Taiwan Strait” for making a closer link between people on both sides of Taiwan Strait. Through establishing such a relative link, Hu strove to arouse these people in Taiwan to realize that Taiwan was not a country and constructed a Chinese national identity as part of their perception.
Additionally, Hu established a common, but ideal, goal of reunifying with motherland for all Chinese on the both sides of Taiwan Strait and criminalized some of them who violated this goal. He intended to define these people in Taiwan who viewed themselves as Taiwanese as secessionists. As described in his political discourse, these secessionists not only impeded peaceful national reunification but they also blocked China’s territorial integrity. In Hu’s perspective, these who were viewed as secessionists could devastate peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and destroy the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation. Thus, the secessionists or Taiwanese in Hu’s public speech could be defined as threatening the entire 1.3 billion people in China as well as the 23 million people in Taiwan. In this vein, Hu’s public speech seemed to increase the level of China’s nationalism, not only to the people in China, but also to the people in Taiwan.

Based Upon the 1992 Consensus. All of Hu’s public speech on the Taiwan issue was established under the 1992 consensus. The importance of the 1992 consensus between China and Taiwan was that mainland China and Taiwan both recognized that they belonged to one-China and that the international society also knew there was only one China in the world. In this vein, Hu followed the 1992 consensus between two sides to develop his public speech on the Taiwan issue. He repeatedly emphasized that China would agree to diplomatic talks but only if Taiwan agreed not to move toward independence as well as acknowledged that Taiwan belonged to one China.

Hu attempted to de-nationalize Taiwan’s status and seemed to regionalize Taiwan as one part of China. Hu seemed to make Taiwan to become another Hong Kong in the future based upon the 1992 consensus. However, the Taiwan question cannot be solved in the Hong Kong formula because Taiwan owned its authority for more than 50 years and had never been administrated by communist China. Thus, although Hu opposed the Taiwan independence, he still highlighted that Taiwan would practice systems different from those on the mainland and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.

Hu did not obviously ask some Western countries which supported Taiwan to seek independence. However, through calling attention to the 1992 consensus, Hu showed the world that the Chinese on the either side of the Taiwan Strait will have the ability and wisdom in solving the contradiction and disagreement between China and Taiwan. Thus, the 1992 consensus would be viewed as a basis to simplify the Taiwan issue and prevent the intervention of international society.

New Wording for National Development. Hu Jintao strove to emphasize China’s willingness to reduce tensions and negotiate with Taiwan. Hu proposed new diplomatic language—two shores, one China—to Taiwan and tried to aim at ending the decades-old hostile relationship between China and Taiwan. Under the new diplomatic language, Hu attempted to open talks if Taiwan accepted the principle of "two shores, one China" while acknowledging that the two sides might differ on precisely what that term meant. The principle of “two shores, one China” was similar to “two system, one China” from the political perspective, but it actually attempted to open Taiwan’s economical gate.

In the principle of “two shores, one China,” Taiwan was still defined as a part of China and the self-governing island territory struggling to present itself as an independent, sovereign country. As acknowledged by Hu, Taiwan may define "one China" differently than the mainland, but it still had to follow the one-China policy for the future reunification. Thus, Hu did not dramatically change the principle of one-China, but already accepted one-China defined by Taiwan’s government. Hu’s purpose to accept Taiwan’s termed one-China could
improve the cross-strait relationships and prompt the economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides. However, the most important purpose may be that Hu strove to accelerate China’s economic development by Taiwan’s economic input (Cheng, 2005). Hu was aware of the importance of economic development to China’s society. Externally, China’s economic development may encourage more and more foreign corporations, including Taiwanese corporations, to invest their businesses in China, which is helping China to experience its economical transformation and become an economic giant around the world. Internally, China can incorporate Taiwan’s capitals by encouraging Taiwanese businessmen’s investments, which can build an interdependent relationship between China and Taiwan. Thus, in Hu’s new public speech the Taiwan issue involved a lot of economical cooperation between China and Taiwan. It was obvious that Hu already placed national development other than ideological identity in his public speech, which may efficiently solve the political quandary between China and Taiwan.

Discussion

Conclusions

The above analysis was to answer the three research questions. Obviously, Chinese leaders were eager to attain the goal of a one-China policy. However, both Chinese leaders’ political discourse did not outline what Taiwanese currently needed. These discourses were not efficiently established for managing the relationship between two sides. These discourses clearly indicated that the perspective of Taiwanese on the Taiwan Strait was peace, but ignored that a great deal of weapons bought by Taiwan’s government from the Western countries were designed to resist China’s attacks. Therefore, Chinese leaders should realize that the political discourse for nation-building should emphasize on establishing a cooperative and communicative relationship.

In addition, the Taiwanese public could not be the only target public in Chinese leader’s discourses. China’s political discourses should take care of Chinese, Taiwanese, and people in the Western countries. Internally, China needed to persuade its people to unify with Taiwan and proclaim the advantages of unification to China. Externally, China had to get approval from international society to have Taiwan as one part of China. Finally, China had still to persuade the people in Taiwan to accept the one-China policy. In this point, Chinese leaders should establish an excellent discourse in their political campaigns to their people, make their political discourses about one-China to be accepted in the international society and persuade the different kinds of publics to understand the principle of reunification. Finally, Chinese leaders also should strategically apply public relations approach to shape more political discourses to Taiwan in the terms of decreasing the Taiwanese uncertainty and anxiety and increasing Taiwan political and economic developments.

Implications for Nation-Building Discourse

This research analyzed how China’s political discourse was used for nation-building. The research found that China’s political discourse did not successfully apply a public relations approach in persuading Taiwanese to accept the one-China policy. It may be considered that China’s national reputation was not good enough to be trustworthy in the international society and that Taiwanese could have some stereotypes of China. Although the researcher realized that the Chinese leaders attempted to change his strategy of political discourse for meeting the needs of the Taiwanese, the China’s stereotype and reputation in
Taiwanese perception may be negative. Therefore, this research indicated that the political discourse based on the public information model can not work well for nation-building. Persuading some nationalists to accept the other nation could only be used in the asymmetrical communication model. In addition, relationship building, maintaining, managing may be the important approaches for nation-building. In this research, the researcher also found the foundation of development communication may be established based upon managing relationship between communicators and audiences. The relationship between the two sides should be with trust, which would prompt the effectiveness of development communication.

This research suggested that the public information model was not effective in persuading Taiwanese to accept the one-China policy because the asymmetrical communication model can not be used in the negotiation between the two equal status political organizations. The researcher suggested that a cooperative and interactive relationship was important basis for nation-building. Many scholars also stated that two-way and symmetrical model was the best one for negotiation. Thus, China throwing away the propaganda-model communication, and embracing the persuasion-model communication would be the direction of the one-China building.

References


