Ubuntu and Intercultural Communication: Power, Inclusion and Exclusion

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Abstract: This address critically examines two paradigms that historically characterised inter-racial relations in South Africa. The (mis)application of intercultural communication concepts during apartheid to manage labour relations is contrasted with the contemporary use of ubuntu, a purportedly unique African concept that promotes the communitarian idea of human interconnectedness. Both concepts are critiqued as forms of inclusion/exclusion. Power, usually absent from discussion of either practice, is here injected into the analysis. Some thoughts on crime as a uniquely Western paradigm are offered. The argument shows how language and intercultural communication concepts can fail in the academy when they are used to promote essentialist agendas, including the claim that crime is a Western paradigm. The paper concludes with some thoughts on cultural studies, drawing on the above context, as manifested in the 2015 Intercultural Communication Studies Conference organised by IAICS and CAFIC.

Keywords: Ubuntu, intercultural communication, intergroup relations, South Africa, power, crime

1. Introduction

My first encounter with the idea of intercultural communication occurred in the early 1980s through The International Journal of Intercultural Relations (IJIR) published by the Society of Intercultural Educators, Trainers and Researchers. An exchange agreement had been in operation with a journal that I edited, Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies. My article published by IJIR was, uncharacteristically for the largely practical and empiricist IJIR, a hard-line Marxist analysis of the anti-apartheid resistance press in South Africa in the early 1980s. The paradigms reflected by the two respective journals were almost diametrically opposed: objective libertarian quantitative research vs. anti-capitalist academic activism that engaged Eurocentric assumptions.

My simultaneous engagement with South African intercultural scholars had mischievously set out to expose the local paradigm as little more than naïve, if well-intentioned, pro-apartheid legitimation (Tomaselli, 1999). These scholars (including those who taught organisational communication and marketing) were largely located in Communication Science departments doing administrative research that assumed apartheid relations of production, theorised then by the anti-apartheid left as racial capitalism (Saul & Gelb, 1981).

The aim of this essay now, as was my earlier intervention, is to understand how language and intercultural communication concepts fail as they become used and abused by scholars,
politicians and ideologues in promoting essentialist agendas. South African intercultural theory, then, was model-obsessed, not as a means to understand interpersonal communication processes, but as a prescription on lubricating apartheid labour relations. During apartheid whites were the owners, managers and supervisors, and blacks were the workers, or formed the reserve army of labour in the so-called homelands, remote rural areas where decentralised industry was being encouraged to invest. Communication in the workplace was commanderist and blunt. The objectives of this strand of intercultural communication, I concluded, contradicted the studies published in *LIIR* that examined relationships and sensitivity themes.

For my keynote address at the 2015 Intercultural Communication Studies Conference in Hong Kong, I decided deliberately to play the devil’s advocate, to address the disjuncture between policy and practice, and the lack of historicization that I sensed with regard to papers presented at the conference. My own preferred paradigm is cultural studies, which framed a number of presentations at the conference (see e.g., Tu, 2015; Piyawan, 2015; Shen, 2015). Where the students applied cultural studies to the reading of music and TV texts, to me, however, originary Cultural Studies (CS)\(^1\) focuses on *aberration* as the prime emphasis of study. CS, a historically embedded paradigm that critically examines power relations of contextualized contemporary phenomena, does not defend itself by claiming the normative, the taken-for-granted, or engage in model building. That’s why this trajectory of CS is always in trouble (see O’Connell, forthcoming) and why it also tries to trouble received ideas (Wright 1998).

Below, I critically examine two paradigms of being that historically have characterised inter-racial relations in South Africa.

2. **Two Paradigms**

First, the (mis)application of intercultural communication concepts during apartheid to manage labour relations is discussed. Second, this 1980s intercultural communication approach is contrasted with the contemporary notion of *ubuntu* (Zulu, ‘we are people through other people’). *Ubuntu* is usually offered as a supposedly unique African concept that promotes the communitarian idea of human interconnectedness (see Mbigi, 1997; Kamwangamalu, 1999). *Ubuntu* is a strong feature in contemporary South African business discourse (see, e.g., Du Plessis, 2011; West, 2006; Nicolaides, 2014).

Both concepts will be discussed as forms of inclusion and exclusion, bearing in mind Stuart Hall’s (1996) observation that every inclusion is simultaneously an exclusion. Power, usually absent from discussion of either social or business practice, is here injected into the analysis. Both contemporary *ubuntu* and 1980s South African intercultural communication were and are rooted in who controls resources, access to communication networks and meaning-making.

International intercultural communication theory at its point of origin was much more nuanced, while exemplifying what Julianne House (2015) calls “old thinking”, but no less geared as appropriated into South Africa to providing managers with models by which to ensure

\(^1\) I use capitals when referring to this politically-derived approach as formalized by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (see Hall, 1981).
compliant labour, efficient production and subservience. Missing, however, from intercultural models, was intuition, empathy, religion and cultural sensitivity. Intercultural studies in South Africa, to fit with apartheid, had inverted Western intercultural communication theory.

Scholars developed models, instruction manuals, and theories on how interactions with people of different colours could best be managed (Du Preez, 1987; Groenewald, 1986). The idea of *ubuntu* was one of the concepts appropriated for ‘domestication’ purposes as apartheid began to unravel during the 1980s. Language planning and reification of indigenous African terms into apartheid discourse was a feature of vernacular language planning and semantic engineering (Tomaselli, Louw & Tomaselli, 1990).

However, even the inverted intercultural communication paradigm that placed whites on the ‘inside’ of power, economy and society and blacks as subservient on the ‘outside’ was considered incomplete as it lacked a ‘group’ (i.e. racial-cultural-ethnic-language) component that underpinned apartheid demographic philosophy and geography. Intercultural relations were thus complemented with the idea of ‘intergroup relations’, which admitted that the different race groups – by the mid-1980s – euphemistically now called ‘population groups’ were irrevocably linked to integrated work places but separate living spaces, drawn from the British India model of partition.

‘Apartheid’ (‘apartness’, initially defined in the late 1940s by its architect, Hendrik Verwoerd, as ‘good neighbourliness’) had become pejorative by the 1980s. Thus a continuous process of semantic engineering disarticulated negative racist connotations from official terminology and re-articulated positive connotations to improve the image of apartheid as a rehearsal for black self-determination in the nine ‘bantustans’ scattered around the country. The bantustans linked to ‘tribal’ areas were intended by the apartheid government to all eventually become ‘independent’ of ‘white’ South Africa even though they were designed as integral contributors – tax-deductible industrial zones serving the central state, which comprised two-thirds of the territory incorporated into the Union of 1910.

Further legitimation of this unique, idiosyncratic and instrumentalist intercultural modelling that was based on ontological ‘African’ difference was enabled by Edward’s Hall’s (1977) theory of high and low context cultures. Holistic and relational forms of communication apply in Hall’s theory to Asian cultures, whereas Western business interactions tend to be logocentric and goal-orientated. The re-articulation of Hall’s work to include ‘race’ or what apartheid intellectuals called ‘inter-group relations’ during the late 1980s was driven by the need to find more flexible models that acknowledged the contradictions of late apartheid that were beginning to anticipate the collapse of this system (Groenewald, 1988). Hall himself was very perplexed at this interpretation of his theory (see Tomaselli, 1992, p. 60).

While during the 1980s race, culture and language remained as intractable ethnic signifiers, the claim that what differentiated ‘blacks’ (as subjects of “high context culture” e.g., *ubuntu*) from whites (as more individuated subjects of “low context culture”) provided a new conceptual

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2 ‘Bantustans’ were officially demarcated areas that were allocated by the apartheid dispensation to black African populations. Also known as homelands, these supposedly ‘self-governed’ areas were simply a means to enforce geographical separation between different race groups. See: http://global.britannica.com/topic/Bantustan
template that now also took indigenous African ontology into account by admitting that blacks were the same but different. The shift was geared towards a model that enabled the setting in place of a discursive structure for political negotiation at the end of the 1980s.

3. Apartheid as a Sign System

Apartheid as a social order had historically entered into the minds of many white South Africans and the West as a (subjective) sign system. The object of the ensuing semantic engineering facilitated by language planners working in conjunction with the state broadcasting corporation (Tomaselli et al., 1990), education departments and educational curricula, excluded overt racism and masked it under Western liberal discursive terms like ‘protection of minorities’, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘own affairs’, ‘own kind of development’ and so on. In South Africa, however, these terms always contained racial/ethnic markers. ‘Minority rights’, for example, simply meant the retention of ‘white’ political control, especially over which ‘group’ (i.e., race) may live and work where (bantustans, ‘white’ South Africa etc.). Thus, if signs have a ‘material’ basis (Volosinov, 1973, p. 11) and are produced within an historical material context (Volosinov, 1973, p. 21), then apartheid was more than just racism (see Louw & Tomaselli, 1991). It was, in fact, a racial-capitalist economic order.

Having revised its interpretation of Western intercultural theory in the 1990s during the post-apartheid transition, the discipline was explicitly morphed into a new indigenised discourse that needed to be talked through as political power shifted from one (white) racial boot to the (black) other.

4. Re-articulations

A discursive re-racialisation process followed the first democratic national election in April, 1994. The ruling new government had been re-articulated by the previously dominant white-led discourse from being an inscrutable and unknowable communist enemy to a democratic constitutional democracy under Nelson Mandela’s humanistic and racially-inclusive watch. The internal resistance that had coalesced around the internal Mass Democratic Movement had (from 1984 forward) shifted from the non-racial signifier (emptied during the late struggle era of all aspects of ethnos, old racial thinking, all people are the same) to a meaning that now was popularly and politically re-articulated as meaning ‘black’ (Louw, 1994). Ironically, as became clear in the mid-2000s, this identification also excludes ‘foreign’ black Africans to the north of the newly constituted nation.

Race and non-racialism were now much more nuanced populist classifications based on shades of black, geographical origin, language, ethnicity and xenophobia. Social regression and mob justice othered black ‘foreigners’ (makwerekere) as ‘devils’ and ‘dirt’ needing to be cleaned out. The populist South African response to perceived unfair competition is to occasionally destroy both the ‘foreign’-owned trading stores located in the black townships and to physically attack their proprietors (Somalis, Ethiopians, Congolese, Mozambicans, etc). (See Sibanda, 2009). These perpetrators, who had simplistically equated apartheid with capitalism, were now waiting for the socialism of the new liberation government ‘to provide’. They were
expectant of socialism at precisely the moment that socialism in the Soviet Union had collapsed and when China was adapting to a market economy.

Socialism was associated with ‘reward’ (entitlement) for defeating apartheid, not “self-directedness” – work or social responsibility for the building of a collective and self-sustaining humane society claiming world citizenship (Bond, 2015). It is doubtful that the largely digitally unconnected South African xenophobic constituency is reflected in the World Values Survey\(^3\) as these mobs seemingly measure one factor of liberation in terms of exclusion of ‘foreigners’. Whether of apartheid as a kind of distorted (racial) capitalism, or socialism as a fixed paradigm of redistribution without production, the concept of economy was similar – a one-size pre-given cake that cannot be grown, but which can only be cut and parcelled out. The issue then becomes who gets the biggest slice how quickly, how the new elite redistributes to itself, and how this self-allocation is legitimised via newly reconceptualised semantic engineering.

5. From Intercultural Communication to Ubuntu

Here is where the most astonishing post-apartheid contradiction comes into play. One unpublished argument is that the African concept of *ubuntu* (interconnectedness, ‘I am because we are’) was appropriated by apartheid intercultural scholars and developed as an indigenous means to better manage labour relations, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility both during and after apartheid. The concept has even been creatively re-purposed as a social research method, as in the practice of self-reflexivity (Harrison et al., 2012). By being all things to all people, the popular and ideological use has eclipsed the discursive trajectory – the genie is out of the bottle – so to speak.

*Ubuntu* is now being applied to everything and anything, across business disciplines, in any context (see Broodryk, 2007, one of the first PhDs to be published on the topic and van Niekerk, 2013). However, of the well-over 300 specialist articles on the subject only a few take a critical approach (see, e.g., Chasi, 2014; Fourie, 2007; Ngcoya, 2009, Swanson, 2007).

The populist post-apartheid auto-centric ‘black’ ideological discourse promotes *ubuntu*, claiming pan-African exceptionalism, disregarding all other humanist and relational systems (and so-called races) that claim similar traits. The contemporary business appropriation however attempts to open the concept to a broader, inclusive, practice.

The hegemony operative here concerns who has the right to comment on the nature and practitioners of *ubuntu*, and whether or not there is a fundamental contradiction between communitarianism and individualism. On the one hand, one debate is however firmly located within a human rights framework that aims to offer suggestions on how some inflections of *ubuntu* can result in the tyranny of the community over the agency of the individual (see e.g., Metz, 2011; Blankenberg, 1999; Oyowe, 2013; Onazi, 2014). On the other hand, much discussion of *ubuntu* assumes an ahistorical framework in a nostalgic imagined pre-modern utopian

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\(^3\) The World Values Survey is a longitudinal study that began in 1981 when a group of researchers in Sweden dispensed questionnaires to 100 countries around the world to ascertain the cultural, political and economic values held by different nationalities. See: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSCContents.jsp
society where subjects of the practice are assumed to behave morally and without consciousness of class relations, modes and relations of production or social formations. From the perspective of the human rights framework, the problem with the idealised discussion characteristic of a historical framework is that its refuses to examine power and offer class analysis. Yet, it is power, securing the moral high ground, and legitimate personhood, that underpins the political and populist discussion, and often the academic one also. Who wields the discursive power of ubuntu for what purposes, with what effect? Who is included and who is excluded? Who benefits from applications of power concealed by the populist discourse of ubuntu?

According to populist logic, blacks cannot be racists; only whites are racist; or Indian South Africans. Makwerekere is slang and translates as ‘foreigner’ and is the new post-apartheid pejorative term of othering/exclusion, reserved for other blacks who enter South Africa from the north – whether legally or as refugees. From where does this logic emerge? While David Matsinhe (2011) connects its aetiology to “colonial group relations” rather than xenophobia, the people who allege whites as the sole possessors of racism cite none other than discourse analyst Teun van Dijk (1991) for legitimation. The latter commentators misunderstand both van Dijk and discourse analysis (Tomaselli, 1999). The choice of van Dijk rather than, say, Norman Fairclough’s (1995) context-based critical discourse analysis by the South African Human Rights Council’s independent researchers is indicative of looking for ‘proof’ for what is already assumed rather than examining with an open mind what actually is found in the data, and indeed, how data itself is constituted (see Luthuli, 2007; Milton, 2011).

6. Crime is a Western Paradigm

Once a group of people identified by appearance are imbued with ideologically-imposed qualities that cannot be questioned, then the conditions for genocide begin to emerge. Take this logic further – ‘corruption is a Western paradigm’, says South African President, Jacob Zuma, (see Naude, 2013, where the phrase is used by a prominent politician to excuse corruption by government officials). This is the new myth that has arisen from the social degradation caused by apartheid’s destruction of rural social economies and the creation of vast, anomic, yet gossip-ridden peri-urban labour camps, where ubuntu was re-articulated into “nothing for mahala” (nothing for nothing) (Coplan, 2009, p. 69). Zuma’s popular support is partly due to his Big Man (authoritative) status but more so to the mass patronage system by which his government ensures the dependency of the majority of the black lumpenproletariat who rely on welfare. It is via this form of social reciprocity (ubuntu) that the mass of votes can be bought by the ruling party – the fine separation of party and state having been eliminated (Coplan, 2009; Mhiripiri, 2010). Extrapolating this, the extremely high and violent crime rate, from petty crime to homicide, might be explained by the naïve notion that because socialism has not ‘provided’, anything owned by anyone else can be forcibly appropriated, and the owner punished with violence for owning the item or even for not owning it. If it is not owned by the victim, it cannot be stolen, or ‘liberated’ – to use popular parlance.

Retribution as a means of punishing offenders (owners of goods to be stolen) is linked to the belief that one justly deserves condemnation because of wrong-doing in the past (which includes wealth accumulation). However, African communities, says Thaddeus Metz, consider it apt to
answer criminality with the expectation of a good result (2011). Africans in such situations, traditionally, would seek to appease angry ancestors (supernaturism), thereby protecting the living community from their wrath, or to mend a broken relationship between the offender, his victim and the community. This approach is usually credited with suggesting a restorative rather than punitive response to apartheid-era political crimes (Metz, 2011; Gade, 2011). As Musara Lubombo (2014, p. 225) reminds, Chapter 15 of the Constitution of The Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, states that in order to transcend the divisions and strife and apartheid’s transgression of humanitarian principles “there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for *Ubuntu*, but not for victimisation” (p. 251). Similarly, sentiments were echoed by activists in Lubombo’s study that the knowing and ruthless spreading of HIV on the pretext that one contracted it from another, while morally objectionable, should not draw forth retribution. Ideally, concludes Lubombo, this is how a person with *ubuntu* should conduct themselves with others – without retribution. Yet, the officially sanctioned retribution metered out to health workers resisting AIDS denialism policy and the resulting genocide was unprecedented (see Cullinan & Thom, 2009).

The idea of finding or developing an African theory on crime and punishment (see Ovens, 2003) has not yet crystallised because discussions to date have been naïve and reductive, even reminiscent of early German-derived *volkekunde* (folk studies) based on a crude approach to ethnos. The practice of ‘muti-murder’ or medicine murder where people’s (especially children’s) organs are extracted for incorporation as ingredients into traditional medicine, is sometimes culturally accepted because “the forefathers told me to do it.”

Much of the uncritical work on *ubuntu* homogenises the myriad of disparate cultures found in Africa under the catchphrases, ‘African experience’, ‘African culture’ (singular) or ‘African values’, all essentialist and expressions of Afrocentricism. This homogenisation is then opposed to a dichotomy between ‘Western ontologies’ – Cartesian, rational and objective – and ‘African Psychology’ taken to be racially unique and largely unknowable to non-Africans. Modernization is often argued by modernized African scholars to have ‘corrupted’ / despoiled the pre-modern morality of the true unspoiled African. How different is this from the pristine, primitivist discourse that was prevalent in some early *volkekunde* texts? The idea of a quintessential Africanness that has been marred by Western influence ignores the fact that cultures are dynamic, always in a process of becoming, moving targets, always being hybridised from both within and without. The mobilisation of holistic constructs such as ‘Africa’ or ‘Asia’ or ‘Latin America’ as the sites of presumably organic ‘cultural value systems’ forgets that these entities were themselves the products of the (Western) geographical imagination; they are not ‘natural’ areas of cultural sameness.

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4 Ovens (2003) blurs the differences between three different assumptions: (1) traditional-African assumptions; (2) the assumptions encoded into work of Africans based in USA when they wrote their material (and clearly influenced by African-American ideologies which tend to “claim” to be African, but actually are Western); (3) South Africans who have been de-traditionalized through various degrees of Western assimilation. In a strange way Ovens recognizes that these three different assumptions exist, but then lets it slip away from her at crucial points in her argument. (Eric Louw email, 13/12/2014).
7. The Failure of Intercultural Concepts

In both the Edward Hall (1977) and Teun van Dijk (1991) examples mentioned above, as these theories and methods travelled, they shed their sophistication, their contexts of derivation, their contextual appropriateness and their explanatory power, and both became cudgels with which to legitimise monological and essentialist politically-led explanations. Dis-articulated from their respective originations, such theories work wonders in totalitarian environments.

In defeating an apartheid based on ethnos a similarly racially-excluding one based on the idea of ubuntu has appeared in one indigenous constituency. Who counts as a person (Gade, 2012, p. 494) often means that blackness is the underpinning criterion of being both human and African. In the new South Africa one needs to look blackish, have a ‘black’ name and speak like a black, to qualify. DNA, identity, residence and ideology count for nothing, for again it’s about racialising hegemony and wealth by calling on sectional (national) identification. As Eric Louw argues, the government that ascended to power in 1994:

is now dominated by a ‘patriotic black bourgeoisie’ who are using their control of government to enrich themselves, while at the same time failing to deliver the promised post-apartheid nirvana to the country’s huge black underclass. To remain in power, this black bourgeoisie needs to invent and popularize narratives that convince the black working class, lumpenproletariat and rural poor to follow them. To do this, they have invented the ‘subject position’ of ‘blackness’ as black nationalism has come to underpin their new project of ‘nation building’. Essentially, a single ‘black nation’ has been invented that fudges over the divisions of class; the cleavages between Western-urbanites and rural pre-moderns; linguistic and tribal divisions; and the divisions between blacks who fought for and against apartheid. The ‘patriotic black bourgeoisie’ has effectively deployed a set of discourses that invites all ‘blacks’ to become part of an ‘us’ within an ‘us-them’ (‘two nations’) dichotomy. This dichotomy underwrites ‘black empowerment’ which in turn further enriches the black middle classes (Louw, 1994, p. 27).

It is not surprising, then, that van Dijk’s (1991) work could be so easily and unproblematically dis-articulated by one school of thought from the European context about which he was writing and re-articulated into the post-apartheid South African context. This specific context has delivered a new essentialism that has subverted non-racialism, reversed the racial hierarchy and designated South African blacks not only as incapable of racism, but extraordinarily, as the only essential humans to inhabit the planet.

Where there was almost no criticism of intercultural communication theory the debate around ubuntu is much more vigorous. The two approaches are equally prescriptive and both work off a priori assumptions about race, morality and integrity. Metz (2011) is addressing larger questions in the context of offering pro-active ways of harnessing ubuntu towards right action and democratic ends. But the situation is much more complex – scientific approaches may be able to develop cultural sensitivity scales but they do not easily measure semantic engineering, regressive language planning, or how cultural self-concepts might result in what
David Coplan describes as ‘an auto-cannibalistic disorder’ (2009, p. 81). This phraseology resonates especially with regard to the ways in which ubuntu has been uncritically appropriated by idealist academic authors to literally mean anything and everything.

8. Some Closing Thoughts in Intercultural Negotiation: The Conference as Translation

Academics are often at the centre of myth-making exercises and all scientific writing should be critical, never taking anything for granted. Academics need to trouble and be troubled. By all means let us develop indigenous and normative theory, but this needs to be done also with an eye to critique and provide explanation rather than mysticism or the imposition of new grand narratives. That critique needs to vigorously engage with the assumption of African exceptionalism. Most crucially, critique needs to de-familiarise the familiar, deconstructionist style. It is my impression that many Asians who presented at the 2015 conference were attempting to critically negotiate these discursive rapids by generating a trajectory of cultural studies that drew specifically on critical discourse analysis and cultural studies ‘readings’ on TV and other texts as a means to negotiate Chinese ‘culture’ (e.g., roles of motherhood, family obligation, business practices) in relation to North-Western social and business practices.

A second cognate strand, translation theory, has become the means for the empirically-minded to achieve this. The study of Western brands and linguistic communities evident in social media are indicators of academic internationalization. Chinese ethno-centricism was not really that much in evidence as similarities were discussed in relation to differences and, unlike highly theorised and over-generalised cultural studies approaches, were more often than not tested and measured by means of replicable empirical research and modelling methods (and also through semiotics). While some might argue that these are incompatible approaches, my own take is that CS should where appropriate incorporate numerical methods and the evidentiary (see e.g., St Clair, 2015, who graphically animates thick description). Many presenters attempted this approach in one way or another; these studies are valuable as markers of academic intercultural negotiation, even if their attempts at methodological hybridity are sometimes methodologically fraught. These studies are indicators of Chinese and Asian scholarship that, unlike the South African ethnocentric and exclusive instances, wants to enter the global world, and not claim total difference or separation from it. The presented and still to be published studies thus become themselves further data for further analysis. As Juliane House (2015) so effectively observes on the practice of translation: “Since the activity of the translator demands a heightened degree of reflection on differences and similarities of the communicative conventions holding in the two linguacultures involved, translation has enormous potential for achieving intercultural understanding”.

Like Thabang Monoa (forthcoming), I argue for a post-Africanist approach to intercultural communication, rooted in pragmatism. This calls for a critical study and understanding of global cultures. In doing so, it advocates for the ‘learning of the world’s best practices’, irrespective of whether they are African, Eastern or Western (Ekpo, 2010, p.184). As was the case at Hong Kong 2015, Monoa and Ekpo both eschew African exceptionalism and offer affirmative possibilities in the sense that they look to the ‘post’ to offer a way out of a suffocating Afro-ethnocentrism and thereby injecting into the discussion what the brief African Renaissance
discourse did not. Their argument breaks the impasse that has circumscribed my own analysis while retaining a sustained element of critique.

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