Cybersecurity of Operational Technology in Electric Grids

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Motivation

Area of Work


PREVENTION

Stopping cyber attacks from happening

DETECTION

Identifying if/when


cyber attacks occur



Description


MITIGATION

Reducing impact of cyber attacks




Identity Threat Vectors to Power Generation and Distribution Infrastructure

- Assessed susceptibility of power plants to threats on exterior electrical lines
- Identified threat vectors from distributed energy resources and IoT
- Identified methods to attack and shutdown power plants from power disturbances created over 100+ km away



Quantified severity of attack impact on electrical motors and drives



Publication: Saha S. and Johnson NG. Point-On-Wave Analysis of Three-Phase Induction Motor Drive Under Fault External to Power Plant. 2018 IEEE PES General Meeting.

Train Veterans and Navy Personnel

- Developed grid cyber security training modules focused on operational technology (e.g., motorized breaker) and informational technology (e.g., router)
- Trained 28 Veterans (over two workshops) in grid cybersecurity (right) with a focus on operational technology
- Took 3rd place in Western Regional Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (left) with a focus on protecting information technology from attack





Methods for Intrusion Detection in Electrical Distribution Infrastructure


- Identified weaknesses and system behaviors in DoD cyber infrastructures
- Created sniffers and automated warning/correction algorithms
- Developed and tested intrusion detection algorithms that compared measured operational data (from SCADA device) to modeled operational data (with data from micro phasor measurement unit, µPMU device)

Publication: Jamei M.,
Scaglione A., and Peisert S.
"Low-Resolution Fault
Localization Using Phasor
Measurement Units with
Community Detection" IEEE
SmartGridcomm 2018.

Central SCADA data analytics Check for inconsistency Check for inconsistency Local SCADA data analytics Local JPMU data analytics Attacker SCADA Substation device SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Local µPMU data analytics Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Local µPMU data analytics Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Local µPMU data analytics Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Local µPMU data analytics Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Bro intrusion detection Framework Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Bro intrusion detection Framework Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Bro intrusion detection Framework Attacker SCADA Substation Bro intrusion detection Framework Bro int

Cyber Vulnerabilities in Navy Installation and Electric Utility Infrastructure


 Completed work in localizing faults in undersampled grid regime when there is loss of resolution. Investigated the dependency on the network properties and introduce notion of cluster level fault localization



 Identified optimum sensor placement for fault localization for maximum possible resolution

Publication: Jamei M., Ramakrishna R., Tesfay T., Gentz R., Roberts C., Scaglione A., Peisert S. "Phasor Measurement Units Optimal Placement and Performance Limits for Fault Localization" JSAC SI Communications and Data Analytics in Smart Grid.

Adaptive Controller Design for Smart Inverter Stability during Cyber-Attacks



Pre-attack Attacked Adaptive Controller


measurements

An Interactive Decision Support Tool to Evaluate Cyber Attacks


- Created visualization of operational technology in grid network and indicators of cyber attack for realtime threat identification and mitigation
- Tracked communication pathways from remote terminal units (attack entry points) to substations and higher-level grid infrastructure (shown below for NAS Lemoore)
- Represented Remote
 Terminal Units (RTUs)
 commonly used to
 connect physical assets
 to the digital realm
 (SCADA)

Transport

Blockchain for Distributed Security of Grid-Edge Devices



- Work in progress to develop a Blockchain based distributed architecture for Transactive Energy
- The proposed architecture resolves scalability issues, uses cryptographic features (software and hardware based) in conjunction with developed state verification algorithms to detect false data injection (FDI) attacks



Publication: Ravi N., Saha S., Scaglione A., and Johnson N. "Keeping Them Honest: a Trustless Multi-Agent Algorithm to Validate Transactions Cleared on Blockchain using Physical Sensors" submitted to ACC 2020.

Acknowledgements







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