

Software Defined Networking for **Smart Grid Resilience**

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Software Defined Networking


Software Defined Networking (SDN)


- Unprecedented flexibility, visibility, and QoS compared to "vertically-integrated black boxes" of old networking devices
- Enables various applications, e.g., optimize QoS, enhance network resilience, etc.

SDN for the Grid: Opportunities & Risks

SDN for greater resilience in smart grid [1]

- Example 1: detecting malicious command forwarding behaviors
- Example 2: filtering out flooded responses from control and field devices caused by spoofed requests





^{*} Chart courtesy of http://twimgs.com/networkcomputing/2012/5/sdn-arch.png


Applying SDN to strengthen smart grid operations

- Smart grid: critical infrastructure leveraging information and communications technology
- Initial industrial effort towards SDN-enabled smart grid
 - SEL-2740S switch

Nevertheless, SDN may also bring in additional risks to smart grid

- Example 1: "darknets" created by SDN rootkits
- Example 2: denial-of-service attacks from weakness with the SDN controller

Cyber-Physical Simulation & Testbed





Fault Injection on SDN-Enabled Grid

Control plane faults Controller failure, switch connection failure, app bug, infinite loop, memory exhaustion, flow rule *modification, flow entry deletion, control message* drop, undefined control message, delayed controller response, time desync, etc.



Physical impact on grid





SDN with Synchronized Clock

[Ongoing work] Investigating the practical benefits of having time-synchronized network updates

- Preventing varying degrees of packet loss
- Eliminating ambiguous states when access control policy is integrated into SDN switches
- Requiring less changes compared to packet versioning

References

[1] Software-Defined Networking for Smart Grid Resilience: Opportunities and Challenges. Xinshu Dong, Hui Lin, Rui Tan, Ravishankar K. Iyer, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk. In Proceedings of The 1st Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop (CPSS), April 14-17, 2015, Singapore.

[2] A Simulation Study on Smart Grid Resilience under Software-Defined Networking Controller Failures. Uttam Ghosh, Xinshu Dong, Rui Tan, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, David K. Y. Yau, Ravishankar K. Iyer. The 2nd Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop (CPSS 2016), co-located with AsiaCSS, May 30, 2016, Xi'an, China.

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