- Professor
- Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
- Phone: 401.874.2238
- Email: huchida@uri.edu
- Office Location: Coastal Institute 212
- Website
Biography
Dr. H. Uchida’s research interest is on the development of socially efficient marine resource management policy. He approaches this topic mainly from two dimensions: production and consumer demand. For the former, his focus is on the effectiveness of collective self-governance by the local resource users. Of particular interest is the institutional designs and rules of the game adopted by such self-governing organizations and understanding how these affect the incentive structure of resource users and the outcomes. For the latter, he has focused on the impact of seafood ecolabels on consumers’ demand and how the force of market demand can be utilized up the supply chain in achieving sustainable and ecologically sound fisheries and aquaculture. Dr. Uchida is the section editor of the Case Study section in the journal Marine Resource Economics, member of Scientific and Statistical Committee of New England Fishery Management Council, and one of the original members of Rhode Island Seafood Marketing Collaborative of RI Department of Environmental Management.
Research
Fisheries economics and management, co-management of common pool resources, seafood demand and consumers preference, sustainable development, blue economy, behavioral economics, collective action
Education
Ph.D. Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, 2007.
M.S. Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, 2003.
Diploma in International Development, Institute of Developing Economies Advanced School, 2001.
B.A. Keio University, 1996.
Selected Publications
- Ishihara H., Tokunaga K., and Uchida H. 2021. Achieving multiple socio-ecological institutional fits: The case of spiny lobster co-management in Wagu, Japan, Ecological Economics 181, article 106911.
This paper analyzes a unique fisheries co-management institution in Japan that has implemented two distinct sets of co-management rules within a single fishing season. - Roheim, C.A., Bush, S.R., Asche, F., Sanchirico, J.N., and Uchida, H. 2018. Evolution and future of the sustainable seafood market, Nature Sustainability 1(8) p.392-398.
The sustainable seafood movement is at a crossroads. Its core strategy, also known as a theory of change, is based on market-oriented initiatives such as third-party certification but does not motivate adequate levels of improved governance and environmental improvements needed in many fisheries, especially in developing countries. - Uchida, H., Roheim, C.A., and Johnston, R.J. 2017. Balancing the health risks and benefits of seafood: How does available guidance affect consumer choices?, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 99(4) p.1056-1077.
Seafood species vary in their health benefits (e.g., from omega-3 fatty acids) and risks (e.g., from methylmercury or polychlorobiphenyls). Reflecting these risks and benefits, multiple public and private organizations offer guidance to consumers on seafood consumption. The effect of this guidance is unknown; previous literature has been unable to disentangle the effects of messages with differing health information, provided by different sources, on demand for different types of seafood. - Uchida H. 2017. TURFs, collective fishery management, and fishery cooperatives, Bulletin of Marine Science 93(1) p.83-99.
The present study examines the role of territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) in the context of fishery co-management, where the latter is defined as collective management by a group of fishers and termed a “fishery cooperative.” - H. Uchida and D.T. Manning. 2016. Are two rents better than none? When monopolies correct ill-defined property rights, Marine Resource Economics 31(2) p.141-164.
We theoretically demonstrate the net change in welfare when moving from an open-access institution to a monopoly resource manager. A monopoly renewable resource manager, such as a harvester cooperative, may create a gain relative to a rent-dissipating sector because of its internalization of the impact of harvesting on the resource stock.