Bargaining power as moderator of the “delay costs effect” in supply chain negotiations

A new paper published in Management Accounting Research explores the extent to which bargaining power asymmetries among supply chain members moderate the effect that the delay costs of the setting exert on negotiation outcomes.

Entitled Bargaining power as moderator of the “delay costs effect” in supply chain negotiations, the research is authored by URI accounting professor Gilberto Marquez Illescas and two other colleagues, Susana Gago-Rodríguez and Manuel Núñez-Nickel.

First, the authors propose that the influence of delay costs on the initial gap between the bargaining demands of sellers and buyers (i.e., initial bargaining gap) decreases when buyers have a bargaining power advantage over sellers. Second, they posit that this moderation effect reduces the indirect effect that the delay costs have on negotiation outcomes (via the initial bargaining gap). To test these notions, they conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment with undergraduate students from a large European university in which they manipulate the relative bargaining power and delay costs of the setting. The researchers conduct their analysis with 292 observations.

The findings support their theoretical predictions. Specifically, results indicate that bargaining power moderates (i.e., reduces) the effect of the delay costs on negotiation processes by reducing their influence on the initial bargaining gap.

Likewise, their analysis shows that because more powerful buyers are less likely to modify their behavior as a result of the delay costs, they face a higher risk of obtaining suboptimal bargaining profits.