SSIREP Research Workshop: Skip Mark (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science)

Discussant: Nina Quinn Eichacker (Assistant Professor, Department of Economics)

  • Date: April 3, 2020
  • Time: 2:00 PM EST
  • Location: This event was on Zoom and has concluded.

Abstract:

Why do some states that undertake IMF loans experience unrest, while others see little domestic backlash? Scholars generally agree that economic crisis leads to an increase in domestic unrest, and that unrest will be greater when crisis is accompanied by IMF lending. However, some states have managed to avoid unrest under economic crisis and IMF loans. This paper argues that states receiving large remittance inflows are less likely to experience unrest under IMF lending. When an IMF program is undertaken, citizens often see their standard of living fall, social safety nets decline, and human rights deteriorate. Remittances substitute for weakening social safety nets and declining economic rights respect, which mitigates the incentives to protest. Further, those most likely to migrate and send remittances home are unemployed men who would otherwise engage in protest. We argue that migration and remittances offer an explanation of variance in protest among IMF borrower states. When citizens migrate and send wages home, domestic unrest declines.